Senate Bill 1, Ohio\u27s Advance Directives Law: Where Have We Been...Where Are We Going? by Hillman, Jean M.
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Journal of Law and Health Law Journals
1993
Senate Bill 1, Ohio's Advance Directives Law:
Where Have We Been...Where Are We Going?
Jean M. Hillman
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jlh
Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Law and Health by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, Senate Bill 1, Ohio's Advance Directives Law: Where Have We Been...Where Are We Going?, 7 J.L. & Health 295 (1992-1993)
SENATE BILL 1, OHIO'S ADVANCE DIRECTIVES LAW:
WHERE HAVE WE BEEN... WHERE ARE WE GOING?
I. INTRODUCTION .................................... 296
II. CASE LAW PRECEDING PASSAGE OF SENATE BILL 1 .......... 297
A. Case Law From Other Jurisdictions ............... 298
B. Ohio Case Law ................................ 301
III. LEGISLATWE HISTORY AND GENERAL PROVISIONS OF SENATE
B ILL 1 .......................................... 304
A. Legislative History ............................. 304
B. General Provisions of Senate Bill 1 ................ 305
1. Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care ... 306
2. The Living Will Declaration ................. 308
3. Health Care Decisions for Nondeclarants ..... 309
4. Miscellaneous Provisions ................... 309
IV. INTERACTION OF SENATE BILL 1 WITH THE FEDERAL
PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT ..................... 310
A. Background of the Patient Self-Determination Act .... 310
B. Interaction of Senate Bill 1 with the Patient
Self-Determination Act ........................ 311
C. Have the Goals of the PSDA and Senate Bill I
Been A ttained? ............................... 312
V. EFFECT OF SENATE BILL 1 AND THE PATIENT SELF-
DETERMINATION ACT ON HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS ......... 313
A. Two Divergent Viewpoints on the Implementation
of Senate Bill I and the PSDA .................... 313
1. Negative View of Senate Bill 1 and the PSDA .. 313
2. Positive View of Senate Bill 1 and the PSDA ... 316
B. Clinical Observations of the Effect of Senate Bill 1
and the PSDA on Patients ....................... 316
VI. PUBLIC EDUCATION ................................. 317
A. Plans for Disseminating Information .............. 318
B. What the Future Holds ......................... 319
VII. CONCLUSION ..................................... 319
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 10, 1991, Ohio's Advance Directives Law, Amended Substitute
Senate Bill Number 1 (hereinafter "Senate Bill 1"), became effective in the State
of Ohio.2 Senate Bill 1 addresses both the Living Will3 and the Durable Power
of Attorney for Health Care,4 (hereinafter "DPAHC") and also makes provisions
if no advance directive has been executed.5 Under the new law, Ohioans can
execute a Living Will and/or a DPAHC to indicate their preferences for future
health care needs.
Since September 27, 1989, Ohio has had a statute recognizing the DPAHC. 6
The initial DPAHC statute allowed an individual to designate one or more
persons to make health care decisions on his or her behalf in the event of
incapacity.7 Although the statute's purpose was to provide a means for
expressing one's wishes regarding continuation or withdrawal of certain health
care measures in specific circumstances, the statute was unsatisfactory in many
ways.8 The amendments to the statute contained in Senate Bill 1 are intended
to improve and clarify the terms of the DPAHC.
1 Advance directive is a general term which applies to both Living Wills and Durable
Powers of Attorney for Health Care. See infra notes 3 and 4.
2 Amended Substitute Senate Bill No. 1 was signed by Governor George V.
Voinovich on July 11, 1991 with an effective date of October 10, 1991.
3 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01 through 2133.15 (Baldwin 1992) contain the
statutory definitions and provisions of Ohio's Living Will Declaration legislation. The
formal name of the statute is the Modified Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act.
Under this Chapter a Living Will is defined as a document which permits a competent
adult to "declare" his or her intentions regarding health care in the event of the
individual's incapacity.
4 OHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.11 through 1337.17 (Baldwin 1992) contain the
statutory definitions and provisions for the Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care.
Under these sections, a DPAHC is defined as a document which permits an individual
to designate one or more persons to make health care decisions on his or her behalf in
the event of incapacity.
5If no advance directive has been executed the individual is known as a
"nondeclarant."
6 Amended Substitute Senate Bill 13, 118th General Assembly, September 27, 1989.
For a discussion of Am. Sub. S.B. 13, See Ruth Anna Carlson, Ohio's New Durable Power
ofAttorney for Health Care Decisions, 1 HEALTH L.j. OF OHIO 93 (1990).
7§ 1337.13(A)(1).
8 The primary deficiencies of the statute were: (1) the DPAHC did not have a
standard state mandated form; (2) it only permitted the withholding of life sustaining
measures if in a terminal condition and death was imminent (the court in Couture v.
Couture, 549 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio 1989) construed "imminent" as some time period less
than one or two months); (3) the DPAHC had a limit of 7 years after which time the
document was no longer valid; and (4) the provisions concerning withholding of
nutrition and hydration were ambiguous and confusing.
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Senate Bill 1 also adds new provisions allowing for any competent adult to
"declare" his or her wishes for health care in the event he or she is in a terminal
condition or permanently unconscious state.9 The declaration is the first
legislation in Ohio which recognizes a living will as a valid legal document. A
living will is not a legally binding instrument unless a statute authorizes the
right to refuse medical treatment in an official act.10
This article will discuss in Part II, the pertinent case history in Ohio and in
other jurisdictions which built the foundation for advance directive legislation
in Ohio. Part III will review the legislative history which led to the passage of
Senate Bill 1; and Part IV will discuss how Senate Bill 1 interacts with the
Federal Patient Self-Determination Act which went into effect on December 1,
1991.11 Part V will analyze how the implementation of Senate Bill I has affected
doctors, nurses and health care facilities. Finally, Part VI will cover how
information about advance directives is being disseminated to the general
public and what ideas are being implemented for the future.
II. CASE LAW PRECEDING PASSAGE OF SENATE BILL 1
Case law has been the foundation for the introduction and subsequent
passage of Ohio's Advance Directives Law. Cases starting with In re Quinlan 12
9A "terminal condition" is defined as
an irreversible, incurable, and untreatable condition caused by disease,
illness, or injury from which, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty
as determined in accordance with reasonable medical standards by a
declarant's or other patient's attending physician and one other physician
who has examined the declarant or other patient, both of the following
apply: (1) there can be no recovery; [and] (2) death is likely to occur
within a relatively short time if life sustaining treatment is not admin-
istered.
§ 2133.01 (AA).
A "permanently unconscious state" is defined as
a state of permanent unconsciousness in a declarant or other patient
that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty as determined in
accordance with reasonable medical standards by the declarant's or
other patient's attending physician and one other physician who has
examined the declarant or other patient, is characterized by both of
the following: (1) the declarant or other patient is irreversibly unaware
of himself and his environment; [and] (2) there is a total loss of cerebral
cortical functioning, resulting in the declarant or other patient having no
capacity to experience pain or suffering.
§ 2133.01(U).
102 FiN. & EST. PLANNER 5228.01, (CCH 1991).
11 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388
(1990). The Federal PSDA requires that all Medicaid and Medicare providers inform
patients of their rights regarding self-determination for health care and record whether
thepatient has executed an advance directive. Further, the providers must educate their
personnel regarding these matters. Failure to comply with the PSDA could result in
providers losing their Medicare and Medicaid payments.
12355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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through Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Healthl3 brought the issue of
patient autonomy to the forefront of American awareness. Through these cases,
new issues were litigated regarding patient autonomy and a constitutional
right of refusal of medical treatment. 14 These court decisions alerted the
legislature to the myriad problems which could arise in this area. Senate Bill 1
is Ohio's answer to these difficult situations.
A. Case Law From Other Jurisdictions
In re Quinlan was the first case of significance to be decided regarding
"right-to-die" litigation. In this cornerstone case, and in three subsequent New
Jersey cases,15 the New Jersey Supreme Court confirmed its opinion that an
individual's right of self-determination over his or her own body survives legal
incompetency. The facts of the case were that Karen Quinlan was a healthy
female who, at the age of twenty-two, lapsed into a persistent vegetative state.16
Medical experts determined that she would not recover. Karen's father sought
to have her respirator disconnected, but her physician refused. Karen's father
applied to be appointed guardian, with the express power to discontinue
medical treatment. The New Jersey Supreme Court, using the "substituted
judgment"'17 test in which the court asks "what would the patient's decision
have been?" decided that Karen's decision would have been to discontinue
life-support. The court stated that the state's interest "weakens and the
individual's right to privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases
13497 U.S. 261 (1990).
14 For a discussion and critique of the tests and standards set by the Courts, See, A.
Buchanan and D.W. Brock, Deciding for Others: Standards for Decision-Making, 64
MILLBANK Q. 67, (2d. Supp. 1986).
151n reJobes, 529 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1987) (holding that the right of a patient in a persistent
vegetative state to make life-sustaining treatment decisions may be exercised by the
patient's family, close friends or guardian); In re Peter, 529 A.2d 419 (N.J. 1987)
(empowering the Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized Elderly to be
involved in the decision-making process with the family members, close friends or
guardians when the individual never clearly expressed their preferences while
competent and the life-sustaining treatment issue concerns an elderly adult residing in
a nursing home); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985).
16The term "persistent vegetative state" ('PVS") is a term which is frequently misused
and misunderstood. A complete clinical analysis of a patient in a PVS will be left to
authors who are much more qualified to interpret and define its complex medical
symptoms. For such an analysis, see Ronald E. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State:
The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight), HASTINGS CENTER REP., February/March
1988, at 27. For the purposes of this article, the simplified definition of a person ina PVS
is someone whose brainstem continues to control reflexes and functions such as
respiration, heartbeat and digestion, but who is "completely... unaware of him or
herself or the surrounding environment." Id. at 28.
17The doctrine of substituted judgment is one which is used by the courts when no
advance directive exists. See Sanford H, Kadish, Letting Patients Die: Legal and Moral
Reflections, 80 CAL. L. REV. 857 (1992).
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and the prognosis dims. Ultimately there comes a point at which the
individual's rights overcome the State interest."18 There are a substantial
number of state and federal cases which have subsequently been decided on
the right of privacy issue which was predicated in Quinlan.19 These right of
privacy cases have laid the foundation for the development of law in this area.
A second line of cases were based on the liberties protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.20 The most highly publicized case in this
area is Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.21 In Cruzan, the U.S.
Supreme Court specifically declined to address the right of privacy issue, and
instead analyzed the issue as a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
liberty interest.
The facts of Cruzan were that Nancy Cruzan, after being severely injured in
a car accident on January 11, 1983, was declared by physicians to be in a
persistent vegetative state (hereinafter "PVS"). After almost five years in a PVS,
Nancy's parents, as her court appointed guardians, sought removal of her
nutrition and hydration 22 which was being received through an artificial
feeding tube. The hospital, however, refused to remove the feeding tube,
forcing Nancy's parents to seek a court order. The trial court held that Nancy
had a fundamental state and federal constitutional right to refuse
"life-prolonging" measures, and directed the hospital to honor the family's
request to withdraw her nutrition and hydration. The case was appealed to the
Missouri Supreme Court which reversed the trial court's decision,23 holding
that
[w]e find no principled legal basis which permits the Co-Guardians in
this case to choose the death of their ward. In the absence of such a
legal basis for that decision and in the face of this State's strongly stated
policy in favor of life, we choose to err on the side of life, respecting
18Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
19Deel v. Syracuse Veterans Administration Medical Center, 729 F. Supp. 231
(N.D.N.Y. 1990); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Tune v. Walter Reed
Army Medical Hospital, 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985); Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741
P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); Guardianship of Browning, 568 So.2d 4 (Fla. 1990); JFK Memorial
Hospital v. Bludworth, 452 So.2d 921 (Fla. 1984); Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332 (Minn.
1984); In re Grant, 747 P.2d 445 (Wash. 1987) (en banc), corrected on other grounds, 757P.2d
534 (Wash. 1988). But see, In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989) (declining to
determine whether right to refuse treatment is protected by a federal right to privacy).
See also, In re Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (11l. 1990).
20U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21497 U.S. 261 (1990).
22 Hydration means fluids that are artificially or technologically administered. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.01(N) and 1337.11(M) (Baldwin 1992).
Nutrition means sustenance that is artificially or technologically administered.
§§ 2133.01(T) and 1337.11(S).
23 Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988).
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the rights of incompetent persons who may wish to live despite a
severely diminished quality of life.
2 4
The case was then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which affirmed the
decision of the Missouri Supreme Court that an incompetent patient's refusal
of life-sustaining medical treatment must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. 25 This decision allowed the State of Missouri to continue medical
treatments which kept Nancy Cruzan "alive" because Nancy's statements to
her roommate were not considered to be clear and convincing evidence of her
wishes.26 An interesting comment is made in the concurrence by Justice
O'Connor where she strongly recommends the use of a DPAHC or a Living
Will as a safeguard to the patient's interest in directing their medical care. This
comment by Justice O'Connor illustrates the importance of having an advance
directive in order to avoid undergoing this level of scrutiny by the courts into
extremely personal matters.
On December 14, 1990, in the case of Cruzan v. Mouton,27 the Jasper County
Probate Court ruled that the parents of Nancy Cruzan had presented the
requisite clear and convincing evidence, required by the State of Missouri, that
their daughter would not want to continue in her present existence.28 The
Jasper County Probate Court authorized the removal of her nutrition and
hydration and on December 26, 1990, nearly eight years after her fatal car
accident, Nancy Cruzan was put to rest.
A subsequent case decided in the State of Missouri, In re Busalacch2 9 is
strikingly similar to the Cruzan case.30 In Busalacchi, state officials in Missouri
blocked Pete Busalacchi from moving his daughter, who was in a persistent
vegetative state, to another state in order to remove her feeding tube.3 1 At the
request of the State's attorney general, the Missouri Supreme Court dismissed
the case, without an opinion, on the ground that the State should not intrude
into private family matters.32 The effect of the dismissal changed the state's
2 4 d. at 427.
25497 U.S. at 261.
2 61d.
2 7 Case No. CV384-9P, Jasper County Circuit (Missouri), Probate Division at
Carthage (Dec. 14, 1990).
28The court decided that Nancy's conversation with a roommate in which she stated
that she would not want to live unless she was at least "halfway normal" was considered
to be clear and convincing evidence of Nancy's wishes.
29No. 73677, 1991 Mo. LEXIS 107 (October 16, 1991).
30The cases are different in that Christine Busalacchi, a high school junior a t the time
of the accident had never discussed health care options with anyone, but Nancy Cruzan,
a 30 year old female, had voiced her wishes regarding life-prolonging treatment.
3 1No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315, at *1 (March 5, 1991).
32 No. 73677,1991 Mo. LEXIS 107.
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common law policy to allow family members to make decisions regarding
health care, where a person is in a persistent vegetative state, and their health
care wishes have not been previously declared.33 The Busalacchi case broadened
the scope of patient self-determination in the State of Missouri.
B. Ohio Case Law
One of the first decisions in Ohio case law regarding the termination of life
support was Leach v. Akron General Medical Center.34 In Leach, the patient, a
seventy year-old woman, suffered cardiac arrest on July 27, 1980, and was
placed on life support at which time her doctors indicated that she was in a
chronic vegetative state. On October 21, 1980, her husband requested removal
of her respirator. The doctors refused his request, and the husband brought the
action. The court appointed the husband as guardian and also appointed a
separate guardian ad litem to represent Mrs. Leach's interests. At an
evidentiary hearing, seventeen witnesses testified that the patient's medical
preference was to not be put on life-support. The court concluded that an
individual's constitutional right to privacy guarantees to an incurable,
terminally ill person in a persistent vegetative state the right to decide future
medical treatment.35The court granted the husband's motion to terminate the
respirator, and on January 6,1981, Mrs. Leach was removed from her respirator
and died.
In the subsequent related case of Estateof Leach v. Shapiro,36 the representative
of decedent's estate sought damages for the time period in which Mrs. Leach
was on life support until the court determined that it could be withdrawn. The
court dismissed the action stating that since the initial use of life support was
properly authorized, no damages would be awarded for the time it took to
secure court authority to terminate life support.37
In Couture v. Couture,38 the court denied termination of nutrition and
hydration of a patient in a persistent vegetative state who had not executed a
DPAHC. The patienthad previously clearly expressed his intentions, but under
the DPAHC prior to revision, nutrition and hydration could only be withdrawn
if death was "imminent".39 The court concluded that a time period of more than
33See Tamar Lewin, Man is Allowed to Let Daughter Die, N.Y. TIMES, January 27, 1993,
at A7.
34426 N.E.2d 809 (Ohio 1980).
35 Id. at 815.
36469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio 1984).
37 Id. at 1052.
38549 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio 1989).
39 See supra note 8.
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one or two months was not imminent, implying that a period of less than one
or two months would be construed as imminent. 40
The case of Couture is overruled in Section 5 of Senate Bill 1 which provides
that it is not the intent of the General Assembly to affect the ability of guardians
of incompetents to make informed health care decisions for their wards.
Further, if this case had been analyzed under the standards as set forth in Senate
Bill 1, since Couture did not have an advance directive, he would have had to
remain in a persistent vegetative state for twelve months before his guardian
could request approval from the probate court to withdraw artificial nutrition
and hydration. 41
Two important cases have been decided since the enactment of Senate Bill 1.
One of the most recent issues to surface was detailed in the case of Anderson v.
St. Francis/St. George Hospital Inc.,42 which decided the issue of "wrongful life".
The patient was an eighty-two year-old male who had specified a Do Not
Resuscitate order (hereinafter "DNR"), upon admission to the hospital.4 3
Notwithstanding the DNR order, the patient was resuscitated by a nurse and
on the following day again stated that he did not wish to be resuscitated. He
then suffered a stroke and was moved to a nursing home where he died
twenty-two months later.44 The estate sued the hospital under a wrongful life
claim stating the decedent's DNR order was not followed. The court held that
no cause of action for "wrongful living" would be recognized in Ohio.45
In the case of In re Guardianship of Myers,46 the patient, Carla Myers, was a
minor female47 who suffered severe head injuries as a result of an automobile
accident on October 25, 1992.48 The preliminary diagnosis indicated that Carla
was in a comatose state and was receiving artificially administered nutrition
and hydration. 49 On December 2, 1992, Carla's father, Timothy Myers,
40Although at the time of the decision Am. Sub. S.B. 13 was not yet effective, the court
held that OHIO REV. CODE §§ 1337.11 through 1337.17 did apply to the case. § 1337.11(I)
defines terminal condition as "any illness or injury that is likely to result in imminent
death...." Neither this code section nor the court defined imminent. This court believed
that one or two months was not imminent, implying that some time period less than
one or two months was imminent.
4 1For a more detailed discussion of this area, see infra Part 11 B.
42 No. C-910574, 1992 Ohio App. LEXIS 5792 (Nov. 18, 1992).
4 31d. at *3.
44Id.
451d. at *14.
46610 N.E.2d 663 (Ohio 1993).
47Although the court records do not indicate her age, it was indicated in
miscellaneous newspaper articles and news reports of the case that Carla was fifteen
years old.
48610 N.E.2d at 664.
4 91d.
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requested that nutrition and hydration be removed, but on December 7, 1992,
Carla's mother, Robin Myers,50 requested that the nutrition and hydration be
restored. Both parents then made an independent application to the court for
appointment as Carla's guardian. At a hearing held on December 30,1992, both
Timothy and Robin Myers agreed to the appointment of an independent third
party as the legal guardian of Carla for the purpose of making
recommendations to the court concerning future medical decisions.51
On January 15, i993, the legal guardian submitted a written report
containing her recommendations and on January 20, 1993 a hearing was held
to determine if the recommendations would be approved by the court. 52 The
report, as well as testimony from two neurologists and one doctor of internal
medicine all concurred that Carla was in a persistent vegetative state and
nutrition and hydration should be discontinued. 53 The court then posed
questions to Timothy Myers, Robin Myers and Penny Myers (Carla's
stepmother), and all stated that they were in support of the removal of the
procedures named.54
The court, in reviewing prior case law, found that there was not a criminal
or civil violation for the removal of nutrition and hydration from an adult or a
minor in a persistent vegetative state.55 The court did determine however, that
two procedural problems existed, namely whether R.C. Chapter 213356 must
be followed in this case and whether the substituted judgment test or the best
interest test should be applied.57
The court indicated that Section 2133.09(B)(2) which sets forth the
requirement that twelve months must elapse from the inception of the
persistent vegetative state before nutrition and hydration may be removed
from a nondeclarant, under the circumstances of the case, would serve no
purpose and would be unreasonable.5 8 The court declared that "R.C. 1.47(C)
states that when interpreting legislation, it must be assumed that '[a] just and
reasonable result is intended." 59 The court found that applying the provisions
5OTimothy Myers and Robin Myers, the natural parents of Carla Myers were
divorced at the time of this proceeding.
51610 N.E.2d at 664.
521d.
531d.
541d. at 665.
55Id. at 667-68.
56 R.C. Chapter 2133 is the living will statute. See infra notes 93 through 98.
57610 N.E.2d at 668.
58/d.
59 1d.
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of Section 2133 to all life support removal cases was "neither reasonable nor
within the plain meaning of the statute."60 The court held that Section 2133 was
not binding in this case and would bring about an unreasonable result.61 This
case undoubtedly will set a precedence in the state for discounting the statute
where it suits the result desired in a case.
The second procedural question was whether the substituted judgment test
or the best interest test should be applied to this case. The court determined
that the best interest test has been the historic guardianship standard and that
statute mandates use of this test in all medical decisions for a ward, including
life-sustaining treatment cases.62 Consequently, in applying this standard, the
court found that removal of life-sustaining treatment would be in the best
interest of Carla.63 The court concluded by saying "[t]he benefits and
arguments are overwhelmingly in favor of removal. It is time to remove the
invasive and futile medical technology. It is time to let Carla die."64
Carla Myers' nutrition and hydration were removed on February 1, 1993,
and she died on February 8, 1993.65
The cases discussed above from both Ohio and other jurisdictions formed
the basis for drafting and passing Senate Bill 1. Using the decisions from these
common law court decisions, the legislature along with representatives from
both the Ohio State Bar Association (hereinafter "OSBA") and the Ohio State
Medical Association (hereinafter "OSMA") formed the framework for
executing both a Living Will and a Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND GENERAL PROVISIONS OF SENATE BILL 1
A. Legislative History
On January 22, 1991, Ohio State Republican Senator Betty Montgomery
introduced Senate Bill 1 on the floor of the Senate.66 The Bill was the product
601d.
611d.
62 d. at 669.
631d. at 670-71.
641d. at 671.
65Alan Achkar, Carla Myers Finally at Peace.; Teen, Once Center of Public Debate, is Laid
to Final Rest, THE CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, February 12, 1993, at 1A.
66Legislative history of the passage of Am. Sub. Senate Bill No. 1:
1/22/91 Bill introduced by Ohio State Republican Senator Betty Montgomery.
1/30/91 To Senate Committee on Reference and Oversight.
2/05/91 From Senate Committee on Reference and Oversight which
recommended as substituted.
2/05/91 Bill Passes the Senate, to the House of Representatives.
2/14/91 To House Committee on Civil and Commercial Law.
6/18/91 From House Committee on Civil and Commercial Law which
recommended as substituted.
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of a joint working group created in 1990 by the OSBA and the OSMA. 67 The
general intent of the Bill was to create statutory regulations which clarified the
DPAHC provisions currently in effect, and to provide Ohioans with the
opportunity to execute a living will declaration, which would be a legally
recognizable document by the State. Senate Bill 1 was favorably reviewed by
the Senate on February 5, 1991, and then went on to the House of
Representatives where, after numerous hearings and drafting sessions, the Bill
was passed on June 20,1991.68 The Senate concurred with the amended House
Bill on June 25, 1991. The final version of the Bill went to Governor George V.
Voinovich on July 3, 1991 and was signed into law on July 11, 1991, with an
effective date of October 10, 1991.69
B. General Provisions of Senate Bill 1
Senate Bill I makes provisions for executing a DPAHC and a Living Will and
it also addresses procedures to follow if no advance directive has been
executed. 70 The legislature intended that advance directives be used to open
up the lines of communication between patients, family members and health
care providers on this difficult subject.
Many people, including some health care providers, have a false perception
that an advance directive is not merely a choice of treatment but a refusal of
treatment. 71 In fact, there have been reported incidents where an advance
directive was assumed to be a Do Not Resuscitate Order without ever reading
the instructions contained in the document.72 Although an advance directive
can be used to specify that your medical preferences are to not continue
6/20/91 Bill amended on House floor. Passed the House, to Senate for
concurrence.
6/25/91 Senate concurred in House Amendments.
7/03/91 To Governor George V. Voinovich for signature.
7/11/91 Signed into law by Governor Voinovich.
67The joint working group addressed three basic issues: (1) revisions in the Durable
Power of Attorney Law created by Am. Sub. S.B. 13; (2) adoption of a Living Will
Declaration in Ohio; and (3) rules for obtaining consent for incapacitated persons who
have not executed an advance directive. See William M. Todd, Directing Health-Care
Choices, 5 OHio LAW 10 (1991).
68See supra note 66.
69See supra note 66.
70This article is not meant to provide an in-depth review of the definitions, technical
requirements and court procedures with regard to advance directives, but merely a
general overview of advance directives and definitions of some of the more important
terminology contained in Senate Bill 1. For a more thorough analysis see Todd, supra
note 67.
71See Linda L. Emanuel and Ezekial J. Emanuel, The Medical Directive, A New
Comprehensive Advance Care Document, 261 JAMA 3288 (1989).
72 Paul Cotton, Talk to People About Dying - They Can Handle It Say Geriatricians and
Patients, 269 JAMA 321 (1993).
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life-prolonging measures under certain circumstances, your documents may
also direct that care be continued, and not terminated. 73
1. Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care
A DPAHC is a document which allows a principal74 to designate an
attorney-in-fact 75 to make health care decisions on his or her behalf in the event
that he or she becomes incapacitated. The determination of whether the
principal is incapacitated can only be made by his or her attending physician. 76
The DPAHC does not become effective until the principal has lost the ability
to make informed health care decisions for himself or herself.77
Once a DPAHC becomes effective it remains in effect until the document is
revoked 78 or upon a date specified in the document.79 If the principal is
incapacitated at the time the document is set to expire, it will continue in effect
until the principal again regains capacity.80 The principal's ability to revoke a
DPAHC has been greatly enhanced under Senate Bill 1.81 In the prior DPAHC
statute, the principal was limited as to how revocation must take place in order
for it to be an effective revocation.
The DPAHC, when in force, can create broad powers in the attorney-in-fact
to make health care decisions for the principal, or it can limit such powers,
depending upon the principal's wishes. There are however certain statutory
limitations which cannot be overridden by the DPAHC. The most important
73 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2133.02(A)(1) and 1337.13(A)(1) (Baldwin 1992).
74 A principal is defined as any competent adult who is eighteen years or older.
§ 1337.11(A).
7 5An attorney-in-fact can be any competent adult except (i) the principal's attending
physician or an employee or agent of the attending physician; (ii) an administrator of a
nursing home in which the principal is receiving care; or (iii) an employee or agent of
any health care facility in which the principal is being treated. § 1337.12(A)(2). These
limitations do not apply if the attorney-in-fact is related to the principal by blood,
marriage or adoption, or is a member of the same religious order as the principal.
§§ 1337.12(A)(2).
76§ 1337.11(B) defines an attending physician to be "the physician to whom a
principal or his family has assigned primary responsibility for the treatment or care of
the principal or, if the principal or his family has not assigned that responsibility the
physician who has accepted that responsibility."
77§ 1337.12(A)(1).
78§ 1337.12(A)(3).
791d.
8 01d.
81§ 1337.14(A) states in part that "ITihe principal may so revoke at any time and in
any manner.
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of these limitations are as follows: (1) the attorney-in-fact may only withdraw
or refuse to consent to life-sustaining treatment8 2 if the principal is in a terminal
condition or in a permanently unconscious state and the attending physician
has determined that there is no reasonable possibility that the principal will
ever regain decision-making capacity; and physician is so qualified to make
such a determination;83 (2) the attorney-in-fact cannot direct the withdrawal of
comfort care;84 (3) the attorney-in-fact generally cannot direct the withdrawal
of life-sustaining treatment from a pregnant principal "if the refusal or
withdrawal of health care would terminate the pregnancy," unless the
attending physician and at least one other physician determine that the
pregnancy will pose a substantial risk to the principal's life or that it is
reasonably certain that the fetus would not be born alive;85 (4) the
attomey-in-factcannot direct the withdrawal of nutrition and hydration unless
the principal is in a terminal condition or a permanently unconscious state, two
physicians agree that nutrition and hydration will no longer provide comfort
or alleviate pain of the principal, and in the case of a principal in a permanently
unconscious state, the express statutory authorization is contained in the
DPAHC; 86 and (5) the attorney-in-fact may withdraw health care that was
previously consented to by the principal only if "[a] change in the physical
condition of the principal has significantly decreased the benefit of that health
care to the principal" or "[t]he health care is not, or is no longer significantly
effective in achieving the purposes for which the principal consented to its
use."
87
The revised DPAHC now imposes certain obligations upon the attending
physician to make a good faith effort to notify certain individuals before
withholding life-sustaining treatment. 88 In addition, the attending physician
must record the proceedings in the patient's medical records. 89 Any of the
individuals notified may, within forty-eight hours of receiving the notice, object
82 Life-sustaining treatment is defined as "any medical procedure, treatment,
intervention, or other measure that, when administered to a principal, will serve
principally to prolong the process of dying." § 1337.11(P).
83§ 1337.13(B).
84§ 1337.13(C). Comfort Care is defined in § 1337.11(C) and "means any of the
following: (1) nutrition when administered to diminish the pain or discomfort of a
principal, not to postpone his death; (2) hydration when administered to diminish the
pain or discomfort of a principal, not to postpone his death; [and] (3) any other medical
or nursingprocedure, treatment, intervention, or other measure that is taken to diminish
the pain or discomfort of a principal, not to postpone his death."
85§ 1337.13(D).
86§ 1337.13(E).
87§ 1337.13(F).
88§ 1337.16(D)(1)(B) indicates in order of descending priority the individuals which
the attending physician must notify.
89§ 1337.16(D)(1)(A).
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to the withholding of such treatment by communicating their objections to the
attending physician. 90 The objecting individual must then file a complaint in
the probate court having jurisdiction, within two business days after
communicating the objection to the attending physician.91 The statute provides
for the manner of stating objections and for the granting of relief by the court.92
2. The Living Will Declaration
The Declaration provisions contained in Senate Bill 1 provide for any
competent adult to declare his or her intentions regarding health care in the
event of the individual's incapacity. The Declaration is more commonly known
as a "Living Will".93
The provisions contained in Senate Bill 1 regarding the living will are
substantially similar to the provisions for the DPAHC. 94 The significant
differences between the living will and the DPAHC are: (1) the living will does
not make any provisions for an attomey-in-fact, the instructions contained in
a living will declaration are communicated directly to the declarant's attending
physician; and (2) the living will declaration is only applicable when the
declarant is in a terminal condition or in a permanently unconscious state,
whereas the DPAHC is applicable to any period of incapacity suffered by the
declarant. In the event that you are incapacitated, but are not in a terminal
condition, the DPAHC would be effective, however a living will declaration
would not. For this reason, it is advisable to execute both a living will
declaration and a DPAHC. Executing both documents provides solutions for
many of the medical problems that could arise where you are incapacitated and
need an attorney-in-fact to declare your intentions regarding health care.
In executing a Living Will, Ohio takes its execution requirements to the
extreme, for instance, requiring that in order to be valid, provisions pertaining
to nutrition and hydration be in capital letters and initialed in the margins.95
A living will declaration becomes operative when the attending physician
and one other physician determine that the declarant is either in a terminal
condition or permanently unconscious state and the attending physician
determines that the declarant can no longer make informed decisions regarding
the administering of life-sustaining treatment.96 In addition, the attending
physician must determine that there is no reasonable possibility the declarant
will regain the capacity to make informed decisions regarding health care
90§ 1337.16(D)(3).
91d.
92§ 1337.16(D)(4).
93 See supra note 3.
94 See supra notes 74 through 92 and accompanying text.
95§ 2133.02(A)(3)(a)(I).
96§ 2133.03(A)(1).
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treatment.97 Although the statutory definitions and terminology are
substantially similar for living will declarations and the DPAHC, Senate Bill 1
provides that a living will declaration supersedes a DPAHC if the issue in
conflict relates to life-sustaining treatment.98
3. Health Care Decisions for Nondeclarants
Senate Bill 1 makes provisions for permitting the termination of
life-sustaining treatment when no advance directive has been executed. 99 The
family may request termination of treatment when the patient is in a terminal
condition or a permanently unconscious state; however the family's decision
must be consistent with the patient's previously expressed wishes, 100 or, if none
were expressed, then what the patient would have decided "as inferred from
the lifestyle and character of the patient."101 The request must be witnessed by
two qualified individuals, 102 and must be executed by the individual with the
proper authority as indicated by the priority list established by statute.103 In
the case of a terminal patient, the attending physician and one other physician
must determine that the patient is in a terminal condition and there is no
reasonable possibility that the patient will regain the capacity to make
informed decisions.104 If the patient is in a permanently unconscious state there
must be certification that the patient has been in that condition for at least
twelve months before life-support can be terminated.105 It is my opinion that
the twelve month period is too long a period of time to apply to every situation,
and as indicated by the opinion in the case of In re Guardianship of Myers
discussed above, at least one court agrees. Further, only the probate court in
the county in which the patient is located (and not merely the family and
physicians) may order the discontinuance of nutrition and hydration.106
4. Miscellaneous Provisions
Senate Bill 1 creates immunity from criminal liability for a patient's
physicians and health care facility when decisions are made in good faith and
97§ 2133.03(A)(3).
98§ 2133.03(B)(2).
99§ 2133.08(B).
100§ 2133.08(D)(2).
101 § 2133.08(D)(3).
102§ 2133.02(B)(1) sets forth the criteria for being a qualified witness.
103§ 2133.08(B).
104§ 2133.08(A)(1)(A).
1OId.
106§ 2133.09(C)(1).
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in reliance on a valid living will, or what is believed to be a valid living will.107
Immunity also exists where a physician or a health care facility fails to comply
with a living will or a consent order in a nondeclarant situation.10 8 This
provision is an important safeguard for care givers in that they are not held
liable for performing unwanted medical procedures. 109 The one major
exception to the immunity provisions is where an individual's actions are
outside of the scope of their authority.1 10
A related issue to the immunity provisions is the transfer provisions which
provide for a health care facility or a physician to transfer the patient to a
different physician or health care facility when the physician or facility are
unwilling or unable to comply with the directions of the attorney-in-fact. 111
This safeguard measure protects not only the physicians and the health care
facility, but also allows the patient's wishes to be carried out when there is a
conflict due to religious or other reasons.
With regard to reciprocity of other state's advance directive forms, if the
forms substantially comply with Ohio law, the declaration will be considered
valid.112 Declarations that were executed prior to enactment of Senate Bill 1
will be considered valid as long as they describe terminal condition and
permanently unconscious state, two of the principal definitions in Senate Bill
1.113 If there is any doubt as to the validity of an advance directive executed
prior to October 10, 1991, it would be advisable to execute new documents
which reflect the provisions of Senate Bill 1. Further, if the declaration does not
contain the specific statutory provisions relating to the withdrawal of nutrition
and hydration, the declaration will not be applicable for withdrawal of those
treatments, and the patient will be treated as a nondeclarant. 114
IV. INTERACTION OF SENATE BILL 1 WITH THE FEDERAL PATIENT
SELF-DETERMINATION ACT
A. Background of the Patient Self-Detemnination Act
The Federal Patient Self-Determination Act (hereinafter "PSDA") was
enacted by Congress as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
107§ 2133.11(A).
108§ 2133.11(A)(4).
109This provision, however, is not a step forward from the point of view of patient
autonomy.
110§ 2133.11(D).
111§ 1337.16(B)(2).
112§ 2133.14.
113§ 2133.15(A).
114§ 2133.15(B).
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1990.115 The PSDA requires that virtually all health care facilities develop a
program for discussing advance directives for health care which are available
under the applicable state's law, with all patients who will be receiving services
at that facility as an in-patient. 116 The patient must be advised of the law at the
time the service at the facility begins. Generally, this has been accomplished
during the admission process. A health care facility has been defined to include
hospitals, nursing homes, hospices and providers of home health care.11 7
The PSDA requires all Medicare and Medicaid provider organizations to "(1)
provide written information to patients concerning their health care decision
making rights; (2) provide written information to patients concerning the
organizations implementation of such rights; (3) document in the patient's
medical record whether the patient has executed an advance directive; (4)
ensure compliance with the requirements of state law respecting advance
directives; and (5) provide for education of their staffs and the community
concerning advance directives. 11 8
B. Interaction of Senate Bill 1 with the Patient Self-Deternination Act
The PSDA and Senate Bill 1 are inextricatable from one another with each
providing specific information concerning implementation of advance
directives law. As illustrated in the prior section, the PSDA is the federal law
which requires health care providers to inform patients of their health care
decision making rights under the applicable state law. The state law, in turn,
provides details of what those decisions indicate with regard to either
continuation or withholding of medical treatment.
It is important that the health care providers explain the law in such a way
as to allow the patient to make informed health care choices which reflect a
thoughtful decision. Further, the ramifications of not having an advance
directive should also be reviewed and explained in order to fully advise the
patient of all potential scenarios. In order to assist in providing uniform
information to patients, the Ohio Department of Human Services has prepared
a pamphlet entitled "You Have The Right" which provides information
concerning advance directives. 119 The pamphlet gives a general overview of
115The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,104 Stat. 1388
(1990).
116The statutory requirements are contained in 42 U.S.C. 1395cc(a)(1), § 4206,
Medicare Provider Agreements Assuring the Implementation of a Patient's Right to
Participate in and Direct Health Care Decisions Affecting the Patient; and 42 U.S.C.
1396a(a), § 4751, Requirements for Advanced [sic] Directives Under State Plans for
Medical Assistance.
11742 U.S.C. 1395cc(f).
118Id.
119This pamphlet was obtained at a conference on Ohio's Advance Directives Law
and the PSDA, held on February 5, 1993 in Cleveland, Ohio, sponsored by the Center
for Biomedical Ethics, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio.
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what a patient's choices are regarding advance directives by listing frequently
asked questions and their answers. Some health care facilities include this
pamphlet with their patient information packet which patients receive upon
admission.120
C. Have the Goals of the PSDA and Senate Bill I Been Attained?
One of the goals of the PSDA was to promote the execution of advance
directives in order to reflect the patient's values and beliefs with regard to
medical treatment.12 1 The increased use of advance directives is anticipated by
some to reduce health care costs as the use of life-prolonging treatments would
decrease. 122 However, since the PSDA's inception in 1991, the number of
advance directives being completed has not increased and health care costs
have not decreased. 123
Although there has been increased awareness by individuals as a direct
result of the PSDA, there is still a significant reluctance by healthy individuals
to execute a document that directs end-of-life decisions.1 24 When compared
with the fact that usually only 50% of the population executes a Last Will and
Testament directing their property, it is not surprising that only an estimated
30% of the people, who are aware of the new legislation, will execute an
advance directive.125
Another goal of the new legislation was to provide patients with the
appropriate information in order to compel patients to actively participate in
their own health care decision making. According to the new regulations as set
forth in the PSDA, the majority of information is being disseminated to
individuals at health care facilities. A standard observation (and complaint)
regarding the requirement of the PSDA that health care facilities provide
patients with advance directive information, is that the forms are given to the
patients during the admissions process. 126 During this procedure the patient
receives a multitude of forms and written material regarding such subjects as
120This information was obtained by taking an informal survey of the health-care
representatives in attendance at the Advance Directives Seminar identified in note 119,
supra.
121 Gregory S. French, The Patient Self-Deterinination Act: Patients Need to Be Informed of
Their Right to Make Health Care Choices, 5 OHIo LAw. 14, 16 (1991).
122This assumption is based upon the premise that the majority of advance directives
request discontinuance of treatmentand notadditional life-prolonging measures, which
would increase costs and thus make this statement invalid.
123 Cotton, supra note 72.
124 This comment is the result of observing estate planning clients and their habits
over the past several years while working as a legal assistant in the estate planning field
at a large midwest law firm.
125 French, supra note 121.
126John La Puma, et. al., Advance Directives on Admission, Clinical Implications and
Analysis of the Patient Self-Determination Act of 1990, 266 JAMA 402,403 (1991).
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hospital policies and insurance regulations and the advance directives seem to
get "lost in the shuffle".127 Further, the requisite communications between the
health care provider (who in many cases is merely the admission's clerk) and
the patient may consist of merely asking if the patient has executed an advance
directive, with no further dialogue after the patient's yes or no response.128 This
lack of follow-up by the health care facility needs to be addressed so that
patients receive the proper information in order to make informed health care
choices. 129
Due to the newness of the laws, no definitive studies have been conducted
regarding the effect of Senate Bill 1 and the PSDA, consequently, it is too early
to decide if the goals of the PSDA and Senate Bill 1 have been achieved. 130
V. EFFECT OF SENATE BILL 1 AND THE PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT ON
HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
A. Two Divergent Viewpoints on the Implementation of Senate Bill I and the PSDA
In any analysis of a subject matter, there is always a grey area, and a group
of people who don't fall neatly into either one of the boxes representing the
diverse viewpoints. I am not concerned here with this grey area but with these
diametrically opposed viewpoints which will illustrate the wide range of
opinions on these new laws and where the problems have arisen during the
period since enactment.
The first viewpoint is of those individuals who vehemently oppose the
requirements of the new laws (both state and federal) and what changes they
believe would make the legislation more effective. The second viewpoint
represents the proponents of the bill and the positive results and changes that
have come about since its enactment.
1. Negative View of Senate Bill 1 and the PSDA
In the State of Ohio, the PSDA's requirement that health care facilities discuss
Senate Bill 1 with patients and their families is viewed by many as an enormous
burden on these facilities. 131 The requirement forces the health care facilities to
1 2 7 Cotton, supra note 72.
12 8 Cotton, supra note 72.
129For an interesting discussion of overtreatment and hospital decision-making, see,
Dena S. Davis, Slim Just Left Town: Decisionmaking on an Intensive Care Unit, 23 CONN. L.
REv. 261, (1991).
130A small-scale, informal study was conducted by the researchers from the
Department of Veterans Affairs, the Robert Wood Johnson Clinical Scholars Program
and the University of California, and the findings were that the instructions given in an
advance directive did not always reflect the patient's actual wishes. See, Sehgal, et. al.,
How Strictly Do Dialysis Patients Want ThteirAdvance Directives Followed?, 267JAMA 59-63
(1992).
13 1 Although the argument is put forth that an enormous burden has been put upon
the health-care providers, I would argue that after the initial expense of training
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educate not only their employees, but also individuals who are requesting
services from their organization. This burden and, in fact, the entire premise of
Senate Bill 1 does not meet with the approval of some individuals.132 These
individuals believe that Senate Bill 1 needs to be completely overhauled in
order to be successfully implemented and interpreted by both health care
providers and the general public.1 33 Senate Bill 1 has also been attacked as
being "lengthy, confusing and restrictive of the rights of patients and
fanilies."134 In support of this proposition, a commentary was rendered in
comparing the Illinois Health Care Surrogate Act, which was passed two weeks
prior to the passage of Senate Bill 1, with the provisions contained in Senate
Bill 1. The commentary stated in part: "Considering they were drafted in the
same time frame, it's striking how different they are from one another in time,
style and orientation...Ohio's law, facetiously referred to as the
"full-employment for attorney's act" is cumbersome (over 60 pages) and
unduly complicated."135 One individual stated that "[T]he current version of
S.B. I forces lawyers to act like doctors and doctors to act like lawyers. It is
supposed to be the other way around."136 In defense of Senate Bill 1, William
M. Todd, one of the initial drafters and a proponent of Senate Bill I warned that
any "tinkering" with the new law could backfire and stated that "[Ilf we go back
to the legislature now, there's no control over what will happen."137
Additional barriers to successful implementation of Senate Bill 1 exist in
several different areas. 138 One view is that there are three basic barriers to
successful implementation of the PSDA: (1) clinical barriers; (2) legal barriers;
and (3) ethical barriers. 139
personnel to comply with the act, the actual time and expense involved should be quite
minimal. Further, I would challenge this group of individuals to propose an alternative
industry which would be more appropriate to handle this requirement.
132Paul A. Greve, Jr., S.B. 1: A Hospital Attorney's Perspective, 3 HEALTH L.J. OF OHIO
145 (May/June 1992). In Mr. Greve's article he states that "I have spent 20 years
employed by hospitals, and I believe that S.B. 1 is the most troubling legislation of a
career." Id. at 145.
133 See Greve, supra note 132.
134 See Greve, supra note 132 at 145.
135New Illinois and Ohio Laws Differ in Spirit, 7 HosP. ETHIcS 8 (1991), quoted in Greve,
supra note 132 at 145, 146.
13 6See Greve, supra note 132 at 150. The Greve article provides a thorough review,
section by section, of the problems and complaints of Senate Bill 1. In addition, it
provides some helpful suggestions on how the Bill should be amended in order to make
it more effective.
137Laura Yee, Health Care Workers Struggle With Law, THE CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER,
February 6, 1993, at 1D.
138For a detailed analysis of the barriers to successful implementations of the PSDA,
see, La Puma, supra note 126.
139See La Puma, supra note 126 at 403-04.
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Clinical barriers exist because of the improper procedures used by health
care facilities in providing the proper information, at the appropriate time, to
patients. If the information is not provided in a manner that is clearly
understood, the patients may "make choices that are neither voluntary nor
reasoned but borne out of the immediacy of their pain, discomfort, fears and
the press of time."140 Reviewing choices during this vulnerable time is a
difficult task, and a patient's thinking may not be clearly focused on what
choices would be the most appropriate for their situation. Further, some
doctors and nurses have stated that when the family members and the
physician have reached a consensus they have not been following the requisite
waiting period required in certain circumstances under Senate Bill 1.141 This
situation can be very dangerous as an unwarranted precedent could be
established at certain hospitals, instead of following the precise language of the
statute.
Legal barriers exist for the reason that the statute imposes a minimal
standard of behavior, which in most instances is the maximum standard
adopted by the health care facilities. 142 In order not to contradict the provisions
of the PSDA and Senate Bill 1, the health care facilities will only implement the
procedures as specifically set forth in the statute, thus avoiding any potential
conflicts. This minimal standard may be significantly less than what the health
care facility would have implemented without the statutory guidelines.
Ethical barriers exist because of cost containment issues that arise when
dealing with Medicare patients. 143 The use of advance directives by elderly
patients is eventually expected to decrease Medicare costs as more patients opt
to limit end-of-life medical treatment which in most cases is extremely
expensive. 144 The use of advance directives to achieve cost containment is
highly unethical and every effort must be made to discourage and reprimand
institutions who influence patient's decisions purely for financial gain.
The complaints of health care providers and other professionals may be
valid, but it is important to remember that the purpose and intent of Senate Bill
1 and the PSDA was to provide a framework for executing advance directives,
and to open up the lines of communication between patients and doctors
regarding this subject.
140 La Puma, supra note 126 at 403.
14 1See, Yee, supra note 137.
142 See La Puma, supra note 126 at 404.
143La Puma, supra note 126 at 404.
144Many end-of-life treatments consist of costly medical treatments which are both
expensive to operate and expensive with regard to the medical personnel required to
operate them.
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2. Positive View of Senate Bill 1 and the PSDA
Although the initial objectives of the PSDA may not as yet been reached,
there are some positive aspects to its enactment. First, with this kind of
legislation where patient awareness is tantamount to successful
implementation, any form of information is a step in the right direction. The
more information the individual receives, from whatever source, the more
likely it will be that compliance will eventually be achieved. In addition,
implementation of the PSDA provides added assurances for both physicians
and patients that end-of-life health care decisions have been made and will be
honored. Individuals can be assured that since they have expressed their
medical preferences, that in the event they are incapacitated, conflicts between
family members may potentially be avoided. Physicians can feel more at ease
in their care and treatment of patients when they are expressly following the
patient's wishes. The advance directive takes some of the guesswork out of
health care and allows the physician to do what he does best, practice medicine.
B. Clinical Observations of the Effect of Senate Bill I and the PSDA on Patients
Several interviews were conducted with the staff members of a suburban
northeastern Ohio hospital to discuss their personal experiences in
implementing the requirements of the PSDA and Senate Bill 1.145 The goal of
the interviews was to determine the procedures, perceived problems, and
patient responses and attitudes, both positive and negative, to the PSDA and
Senate Bill 1.
The following is an overview of the information obtained during the course
of the interviews. First, the procedural aspects, as required by the PSDA, were
discussed. The procedure at this facility, (which I was informed was similar to
the procedure of the majority of the health care facilities), was to obtain
information from the patient during the admissions process. The patients were
asked: "Do you currently have an advance directive?" The response is entered
into the computer, and if the patient has an advance directive, a copy is
requested and placed in the patient's file. 146 The admissions clerk indicated
that each situation is handled differently depending upon the patient's
response to the initial question, but that typically if the patient did not have an
advance directive, an information packet would be provided to them.1 47 In
addition, social workers were referred to the patients for follow-up and to
answer any questions.
The hospital indicated that only about 5% of the patients being admitted
have an advance directive in place. These 5% consist mainly of older couples
14 51n order to elicit more candid responses from the interviewees, it was agreed that
their names and the name of their employer would remain anonymous.
146The staff did not know what happened to it after that point, or if anyone actually
read or discussed it with the patient.
14 7The information packet contains a pamphlet which explains the current law in
Ohio, a copy of a living will and a copy of a durable power of attorney for health care.
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who are well connected in the community, and widows or widowers who had
gone through a serious illness with a spouse. Overall, they indicated that the
response from the patients was positive, although it was determined that the
majority of the patients did not address the issue of an advance directive until
well after they were discharged from the hospital. Frequently, individuals
would contact the social worker whom they were initially referred to, to discuss
the information they received while in the hospital. Many indicated that they
just did not want to deal with the issue while they were in the hospital, but did
want to receive more information now that they had time to think about their
decisions.
A surprising number of inquiries came from unsolicited requests from
members of the community who made cold calls to the hospital requesting
information about advance directives. The hospital's procedure is to send out
their initial patient admission packet to these individuals. The hospital staff felt
that it was their responsibility to disseminate information to the community,
and they frequently go out as a team to local nursing homes and elder care
centers to give lectures on the subject of advance directives.
Although community education is a high priority, they also indicated that it
was the education of the staff members that was the most important. If the staff
is comfortable with advance directives and their purpose, and if they exhibit a
comfort level with the information, that confidence will be transferred to the
individuals they are in contact with.
Overall, the hospital staff found that the requirements of the PSDA were
more burdensome in writing then they were in actual application. They also
discovered that by discussing the details of an advance directive, the law
actually opened up a door for them to discuss various potential problems and
health care issues with patients, through the options available in an advance
directive.
VI. PUBLIC EDUCATION
Despite the educational campaigns sponsored by both the Ohio State
Medical Association (hereinafter "OSMA"), and the Ohio State Bar Association
(hereinafter "OSBA") plus the substantial efforts of various other governmental
organizations such as the Ohio Department of Human Services and the Ohio
Department of Aging, most people are still either unaware of or confused by
the advance directives that are available to them. Educational efforts by all
organizations are continuing with the optimistic view that eventually
compliance with both the PSDA and Senate Bill I will be achieved.148
148The Society for the Right to Die, located in New York City has published a
compilation of every living will and durable power of attorney for health care in the
United States. The loose-leaf binder, which will be updated periodically, entitled
"Refusal of Treatment Legislation" is available by contacting the Society for The Right
to Die at (212) 246-6973.
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A. Plans For Disseminating Information
One of the details of the PSDA was to require a national public education
campaign in order to inform the general public of their options regarding
participation in and direction of health care decisions. Through the efforts of
the Ohio State Medical Association and the Ohio State Bar Association, a joint
campaign was implemented to provide information and forms to the general
public. This information can be obtained through the OSBA and the OSMA as
well as other organizations. 149 The educational package from the OSBA
consists of a 14 minute videotape highlighting the new law and provides
answers to general questions about advance directives. The videotape is
intended for use in client or patient situations to give general background
information about advance directives. The videotape is not an in-depth look
into Senate Bill 1, but it is a starting point for promoting communication
between physicians and patients. One Ohio hospital is showing the video on
their in-house patient education channel which also provides other useful
information regarding the hospital's policies and procedures. 150 The
educational package available from the OSBA also includes a speaker's kit,
consisting of several documents, which provides information for public
speakers and for outlining uniform answers to the standard questions which
patients may have. Finally, a small fact sheet produced by the OSBA entitled
"What you Need to Know About Ohio's Living Will Law" is included. The fact
sheet is generally a repetition of the information contained on the videotape,
but again is useful for general education and discussion purposes.
Standard Ohio Living Will and DPAHC forms are available from both the
OSBA and the OSMA.151 These forms are the standard state mandated forms
and should be used in lieu of a computer generated form. The use of the
standard form will alleviate any questions as to whether all of the requirements
of the advance directive as stated in Senate Bill 1 are contained in the document.
Physicians and health care facilities in general are more comfortable in
receiving the standard forms so that no additional review by legal departments
is needed in order to discern if the document conforms to Ohio law. 152
149To receive a Living Will information kit, write to: OSBA Living Will Program, P.O.
Box 16562, Columbus, Ohio 43216-6562. The cost of the kit is $15.00 for members of the
OSBA and $30.00 for non-members. hiformation is also available through the Ohio State
Medical Association, P.O. Box 931, Columbus, Ohio 43216-0931; the Ombudsmen's
office, 1-800-282-1206; and the Legal Headline for Older Ohioans at 1-800-488-6070.
150Memorandum from S. Sarkovich, Quality Assurance Coordinator, MetroHealth
SaintLuke's Medical Center, PSDA compliance Memo, November 29,1991 (on file with
author).
151To obtain a free living will form for any state, send a self-addressed, business-sized
envelope to: Choice in Dying, Box Q, 250 W. 57th Street, New York, New York 10107.
152See French, supra note 121.
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B. What The Future Holds
In a continued effort to educate the public about the advance directive
provisions contained in Senate Bill 1, the Ohio General Assembly has recently
passed Substitute House Bill Number 427 (hereinafter "House Bill 427").
Although the majority of the sections of House Bill 427 took effect on October
18, 1992, the Bill contains two new Ohio Revised Code Sections regarding
advance directives which did not take effect until May 1,1993.153 The new code
sections provide for a designation on an individual's driver's license of
whether or not he has executed either a Durable Power of Attorney for Health
Care or a Living Will Declaration. If the Applicant for a driver's license has
executed either type of document, he may, if he wishes, indicate this on his
driver's license. As this statute has recently taken effect, it is not yet known
how this legislation will impact public awareness of advance directives.
This statute may be an effective way of communicating the advance directive
choices which are available to Ohioans in Senate Bill 1. Considering the fact
that the majority of Ohioans have a valid driver's license which needs to be
renewed every four years, the potential to reach a substantial number of
individuals could be achieved through this new legislation.154
VII. CONCLUSION
Senate Bill 1 is Ohio's first comprehensive statute which provides a
legislative template for executing an advance directive. This legislation,
although not yet perfected, and not yet embraced by all members of society, is
a statute which was critically needed in this state.
Like any new legislation, the education and dissemination of information is
a slow process which gradually accelerates as more of the mainstream
population becomes aware of its existence. Even at the introduction of Senate
Bill 1, proponents of the Bill knew that it wouldn't satisfy all of the individuals
that it would affect. As early as October of 1991, the month that Senate Bill 1
took effect, William M. Todd, a drafter and proponent of the Bill stated that
"Perhaps no one will be content with all of the provisions of Senate Bill 1, but
these are not easy issues and in many cases there are no clear-cut answers."155
The process of educating the public has been put in motion, and although it
would be optimistic at best to assume that the majority of individuals will
execute an advance directive, the current numbers are still somewhat
disappointing. Nevertheless, even if the original lofty goals of the PSDA and
Senate Bill 1 have not yet been attained, the lines of communication have been
opened, the requisite statutes are in place and with continued public awareness
153§ 4507.06(A)(1)(f0 and § 4507.13(A).
154A caveat to any high expectations is the reality that the organ donation program
has not been a complete success.
155Todd, supra note 67 at 10.
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through education, the goals may still be realized. 156 Educating the public can
plant the seed, but it cannot do it all. Follow-up and interaction with the public
is necessary in order for the PSDA and Senate Bill 1 to be successfully
implemented.
JEAN M. HILLMAN
156Lawrence J. Nelson, an attorney and bioethics consultant in Illinois states that
How smoothly the implementation [of the PSDA] is going depends on
the hospitals and hospital lawyers and the attitude toward the law ...
If they see it as a burdensome government regulation and they do the
absolute minimum, it's not going to have the effect it could. But if they
look at it in a positive way to communicate information so that patients
can make up their own minds about treatments, to make it easier on
everyone, implementation might be very smooth.
Quoted in Terese Hudson, Hospitals Work to Provide Advance Directives Information, 65(3)
HosPrrALs 26 at 32 (1991).
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